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Abstract

Sommers posed the question 'Do We Need Identity?' and answered in the
negative. According to Sommers, the need for a special identity relation resulted from an arbitrary distinction between concept and object introduced by
Frege and retained in modern predicate logic (MPL). This is reflected in the
syntactic distinction between predicate and individual constant. Traditional
formal logic (TFL) does not respect this distinction and, as a consequence, has
no need for a special identity relation. But Sommers' position has not gained
general acceptance. On the contrary, it has received considerable criticism.
While it is conceded that TFL can express the identity of individual constants,
it is quickly pointed out that this falls far short of providing the expressiveness
of the logical identity relation. But the precise extent of the deficit in expressiveness, if indeed there is any deficit, has not been determined. It appears that
Sommers' position on identity has not been adequately formalized to permit
such a determination. This paper formalizes and extends Sommers' position on
identity. This formalization is compared with MPL to define precisely the difference in expressive power. The conclusion is that it has less expressive power
than MPL, but nonetheless does provide essentially all the expressiveness of
the logical identity relation. The formal language defined for this investigation is similar to the language of MPL. The similarity will not only facilitate
comparison, but perhaps will also make this formal language more palatable to
readers whose experience and/or predisposition favors MPL.
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1

Introduction

The question 'Do We Need Identity?' was raised by Sommers

(4, 5]. He answered that a special identity relation is not needed in traditional formal
logic (TFL), since predication and the laws governing it already allow identity to be
expressed. But Frege injected a new, and arbitrary, distinction into modern predicate
logic (MPL), which gave rise to the need for an identity relation.
The distinction is between concept and object, reflected in the syntactic distinction
between predicate and individual constant (or name). Its import is that a predicate
can predicate, but an individual constant cannot. Consequently, two individual constants can be related only under a binary predicate. In particular, two individual
constants can be declared identical only by a binary identity relation.
TFL does not respect this distinction. In TFL an individual constant, denoting an
object, can occupy the predicate position. For example, 'Hans is John' predicates the
property (concept) of being John to Hans. But if 'John' is a predicate in 'Hans is
John', consistency dictates that it is a predicate also in 'John is kind', and hence can
be quantified. Thus 'some John is kind' must be well-formed, and must assert that
the denotations of the predicates 'John' and 'kind' have nonempty intersection. Since
'John' is singular (i.e., denotes a singleton set), this is tantamount to asserting that
the unique element in the set denoted by 'John' is a member of the set denoted by
'kind'. Therefore, 'John is kind' can be viewed as abbreviation for 'some John is kind'.
Because of the singularity of the predicate 'John', 'some John is kind' is equivalent
to 'all John is kind'. To indicate that 'John' is thus simultaneously universally and
existentially quantified, Sommers writes '*John is kind'. This he calls 'wild quantity'.
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When the arbitrary distinction between object and concept is eliminated, the need
for a special identity relation disappears. Thus '*Hans is John' asserts that the denotations of the predicates 'Hans' and 'John' have nonempty intersection (equivalently,
the denotation of 'Hans' is a subset of the denotation of 'John'), that is, are identical. Sommers gives a demonstration that for individual constants a and b, the unary

predication '*a is b' in TFL has all the properties ascribed to the binary predication
'a = b' in MPL.
But Sommers' position has not gained general acceptance. On the contrary, it has
received considerable criticism. While it is conceded that '*a is b' can express the
identity of individual constants, it is quickly pointed out that this falls far short of
providing the expressiveness of the logical identity relation. But the precise extent of
the deficit in expressiveness, if indeed there is any deficit, has not been determined.
It appears that Sommers' position on identity has not been adequately formalized to
permit such a determination.
This paper formalizes and extends Sommers' position on identity. This formalization
is compared with MPL to define precisely the difference in expressive power. The
conclusion is that it has less expressive power than MPL, but nonetheless does provide
essentially all the expressiveness of the logical identity relation.

The formal language defined for this investigation (hereinafter referred to as 'PCS')
is similar to the language of MPL (hereinafter referred to as 'PCI'). The similarity
will not only facilitate comparison, but perhaps will also make PCS more palatable
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to readers whose experience and/or predisposition favors MPL. PCS differs from PCI
in that the distinction between predicate and individual constant is not present.
In the following sections, the syntax and semantics of PCS are defined. Then the
essential properties of singular expressions are established. To facilitate comparison, a
conventional definition of PCI is provided. Translation from PCS to PCI demonstrates
that PCS is equivalent to a subset of PCI. Translation from PCI to PCS is shown to be
partial only, identifying a deficit in expressiveness of PCS relative to PCI. Therefore,
there are wffs in PCI for which there are no semantically equivalent wffs in PCS.
However, for such a wff in PCI, there is a schema in PCS that expresses the same
meaning. In particular, any theory that can be axiomatized with axiom schemas in
PCI can be axiomatized with axiom schemas in PCS. The treatment throughout is
semantic; however, an axiomatic treatment can also be given (see [3]).
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2 Definition of PCS

This section defines PCS, a first-order language that

formalizes and extends Sommers' ideas regarding singular terms. PCS resembles PCI,
the language of MPL, with the following difference. Singular predicates supplant
individual constants and functions. It is not unusual to treat individual constants
as nullary functions, nor to treat n-ary functions as ( n

+ 1)-ary

predicates. But it

appears that these devices have not been used together. When they are, the result
is a uniformity in the treatment of individual constants, functions and predicates.
While PCS does not have an identity relation, identity of singular expressions, which
correspond to terms in PCI, can be expressed. Moreover, deduction with identicals
can be performed conveniently in PCS.

2.1

Syntax

The vocabulary of PCS is listed first. Let w+ := w- {0}.

1. Predicate symbols P of two kinds
(a) ordinary predicate symbols R

= UnEw+ Rn, where Rn = {Ri: i

E

w}, and

(b) singular predicate symbols S = UnEw+ Sn, where Sn = {Sf : i E w}
2. Variable symbols V = {Vi : i E w}
3. Boolean operators A and --,
4. Quantifier 3
5. Parentheses ( and )
6. Comma,
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There are no terms in PCS. In their stead, singular expressions are used. These are
defined as follows:

1. if S 1 E St and and

X

E

v then S

1

(X) is a singular expression

2. if S"'+l E Sn+l, x, x 1 , ..• , Xn E V are distinct and St, ... , Sn are singular expressions, then 3x1(S1(xt) 1\ ···A 3xn(Sn(xn) 1\ S"'+l(xt, ... , Xn, X))···) is a singular
expression
3. nothing else is a singular expression

Expressions in PCS are defined as follows:

1. if P"' E ('R.n. USn) and

Xt, ••• ,

Xn E V, then P"'(xt, ... , Xn) is an expression

2. if 4> is an expression then -,4> is an expression
3. if 4>, 1/J are expressions then ( 4> 1\ 1/J) is an expression
4. if 4> is an expression and x E V occurs free in

4>, then 3x4> is an expression

5. nothing else is an expression

Free and bound variables are defined in the usual way. When a list of variable
symbols follows an expression symbol, e.g., 4>(xt, ... , xn), these variables are all the
free variables and only free variables in the expression. When the expression symbol
is used without a list of variable symbols, it is left open which variables are free in
that expression. As a general rule, it is assumed that all expressions are rectified.
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Since the intended interpretation of 3x4>( Xt, • •• , Xn, x) is identical to that of 3y<f>( x1, ... ,
Xn,

y ), PCS expressions are defined to be equivalence classes, each equivalence class

consisting of all alphabetic variants. This equivalence can be defined formally (e.g.,
see Barnes and Mack [1 ]), but this will not be done here. Any member of a given
equivalence class will be used to represent the class. Hence the two forms given above
represent the same PCS expression.
In the sequel, parentheses are dropped whenever no confusion can result. Metavariables are used as follows: Rn ranges over Rn; sn ranges over Sn; pn ranges over

Rn USn; x, y, z range over V; S ranges over singular expressions; and 4>, 'lj;, () range
over expressions. Applying subscripts to these symbols does not change their ranges.

2.2

Semantics

An interpretation of PCS is a pair I

= (V, 9) where V is a

nonempty set and 9 is a mapping defined on P satisfying:

1. if Rn ERn, then 9(Rn)

~

vn

2. if sn+l E Sn+b then 9(Sn+l) ~ vn+l such that for all d1 , ... , dn E V there
exists dE V with (dt, ... , dn, d) E 9(Sn+l) and for all d' E 'D, (d1 , ... , dn, d') E
9(Sn+l) implies d'

=d

Let g E vv be an assignment of values to variables, and 4> be an expression of PCS.
Then 4> is satisfied by g in I (written If= <f>[g]) iff one of the following holds:

1. 4> = pn(Xt, ... ,xn) and (g(xl), ... ,g(xn)) E 9(Pn)
2. 4> =

•'l/J and I~ 'lj;[g]
8

3. 4>

= 7/J A(} and (I p 7/J[g] and I p 8[g])

4. 4> = 3xtjJ, where x occurs free in 7/J, and there exists g' E 'Dv that agrees with g
off x such that I

f= tP [g1

An expression 4> is true in I, written I
written

2.3

I= </>, iff for all g E 'Dv, I I= <f>[g].

</> is valid,

p </>, iff </> is true in every interpretation.

Abbreviations

It is convenient to extend PCS by introducing the following

abbreviations.

1.

tP V (} := •( ...,7/J A •8)

2. '1/J -+ () := •( '1/J A •0)
3. '1/J +-+ (} := (¢-+ 8) A (0-+ ¢)

The semantics for these abbreviations can be given directly as follows:

1. If </>

= '1/J V () then I p </>[g] iff (I p '1/J[g] or I p 8[g])

2. If 4> = '1/J -+ (} then If= </>[g] iff (I
3. If 4>

= '1/J

4. If </>

= Vx,P,

p '1/J[g] implies I p O[g])

+-+(}then If= </>[g] iff (If= ,P[g] iff If= O[g])
where x occurs free in ¢, then I

agree with g off x, I

p tjJ[g']
9

f=

<f>[g] iff for all g'

E

vv

that

3

Properties of singular expressions

Singular expressions play a central

role in PCS. The denotation of a singular expression is a single (though not necessarily unique) individual. Singular expressions commute in a certain way with the
Boolean operators. The principal result is that not only unary singular predicates,
corresponding to individual constants in PCI, but more generally singular expressions
exhibit 'wild quantity'. These results are established in this section.
In the following, if </>(xt, ... , xn) is a wff, I

f=

</>[dt, ... , dn] will abbreviate I

f=

</>[g]

where g E 1JV such that g(xt) = dt, ... ,g(xn) = dn.

LEMMA

1 There exists d E V such that I

f=

S[d] and for all d' E 'D, I

f=

S[d']

implies d' = d.

proof:

Define the depth of a singular expression as follows. depth(S 1 (x)) := 0.

depth(3xt(St(Xt)A· · ·!\3xn(Sn(xn)!\Sn+l(xt, ... , Xn, x)) · · ·)) := 1+max{depth(Si(xi)) :
1

< i ~ n }. The proof is a straightforward induction on the depth of S(x ).

In the following, Lemma 1 will be abbreviated 3!d E V: If= S[d].

THEOREM

2 IF 3xt(St(xt)A· · ·!\3xn(Sn(xn)A•</>(xt, ... , Xn)) · · ·) iffi

f= •3x 1 (S1 (xt)A

· · · !\ 3xn(Sn(xn) !\ </>(xt, ... , Xn)) · · ·).

proof:

(I

F

I

F

3xt (St (xt) !\ · · · !\ 3xn( Sn( Xn) !\ •</>( Xt, . .. , Xn)) · · ·) iff 3!d1 · · · 3ldn :

St[dt]) !\ '· · !\ (I

F

Sn[dn])!\ (I

F

•</>[dt, ... , dn]) iff 3!dt · • · 3!dn : (I

F

St[dt))A· ··!\(IF Sn[dn])!\ (I l;b </>[dt, ... , dn]) iff I l;b 3xt(St(Xt)A· · ·!\3xn(Sn(Xn)A
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¢>(x 1 , ••• , Xn)) · .. ) iff I

f= --,3x1(S1 (xt) /\ · · · /\ 3xn(Sn( Xn) /\ <P(xb ... , Xn)) · · ·) (follows

from the definition of satisfaction and Lemma 1).

COROLLARY

3 If= 3xt(St(Xt)A· · ·/\3xn(Sn(Xn)A¢>(xt, ... , Xn)) · · ·) iffi

F 'Vxt(St(xt) ~

· · · ~ 'v'xn(Sn(xn) ~ <P(xb ... , Xn)) · · ·).

Using the notation of restricted quantification, this result can be recognized as asserting the 'wild quantity' of singular expressions, e.g., (3x : S(x))(¢>(x))

+-+

('Vx :

S(x))(<P(x)).

THEOREM

iff (I

4 I

f= 3x1(S1(x1) /\ · · • /\ 3xn(Sn(Xn) A<P(xiu · · ·, Xi

f= 3xi (Si (xs
1

1

1 ) /\ • • • /\

· · · /\ 3 Xim (Sim (X im) /\ tP (X il ,

proof:

1)

A1/J(xiu · · ·, Xim)) · · ·)

3xi1(8; 1 (xi,)/\ <P(xiu ... , Xi 1)) • • ·) and I

••• ,

f= 3xil (Sil (xil) /\

Xim )) · · ·)) 1 where {i 1 , ... , i I} U {j1 , ... , Jm} = { 1, ... , n} .

If= 3xl(SI(xl) /\ · · · /\ 3xn(Sn(xn) /\ <P(xiu· .. , Xi 1 )

/\

1/J(xiu ... , Xim)) ···)iff

3!dl "· 3!dn : (IF 81 [d1])/\ .. · /\ (IF Sn[dn])/\ (I F (</>(Xip · .. , Xi1 ) /\1/J(xil, · .. , Xim)
[dil' ... 'dim]) iff 3!dl ... 3!dn :(I F sl [dl])/\· .. /\(I F Sn[dn])A (I F <P[dil' ... 'di,])/\

(I

F ¢[diu ... , dim])

/\(I

F

3xj1 (Sil (Xj1 )

iff (I

F 3xi

/\ . . • /\

1

(Si 1 ( Xi 1 )

/\ "

• /\

3xs,(Si1 ( Xi 1 )

/\

</>( Xiu ... , Xi 1 )) . . ·))

3xim(Sim(xim) /\ 1/J(xiu· .. , Xim)) .. ·)) (follows from the

definition of satisfaction and Lemma 1).
Thus singular expressions distribute over conjunction. Examples, using the notation
of restricted quantification, are: (3x: S(x))(¢>(x)/\¢(x))

S(x))(¢(x))) and ('Vx: S(x))(<P(x) /\ ¢())

+-+
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+-+

((3x: S(x))(¢>(x))A(3x:

(('v'x: S(x))(<P(x)) /\ ¢()).

4

The expressiveness of PCS relative to PCI will

PCS and PCI Compared

be investigated through the use of meaning-preserving translations between the two
languages. Translation from PCS to PCI is not surjective. The difference of PCI and
the image of PCS in PCI will give the deficit in expressiveness.
To facilitate definition of a translation function, a brief definition of PCI will first be
given. This definition is standard, but chosen to parallel the definition of PCS given
in Section 2.
4.1

Definition of PCI

The vocabulary of PCI consists of the following.

1. Predicate symbols R

= UnEw+ Rn, where Rn = {Ri : i

E w}

2. Individual constant symbols C = { Ci : i E w}
3. Function symbols :F = UnEw+ Fn, where Fn = {f? : i E w}
4. Variable symbols V

= {Vi: i

E

w}

5. Boolean operators A and ...,
6. Identity relation

=

7. Quantifier 3
8. Parentheses ( and )
9. Comma,

Terms in PCI are defined as follows:
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1. individual constant symbols and variable symbols are terms

2. if fn E Fn and it, . .. , in are terms, then fn(tt, ... , in) is a term
3. nothing else is a term

In the following, i will be used as a metavariable ranging over terms of PCI.
Expressions in PCI are defined as follows:

1. if Rn ERn and it, ... , in are terms, then Rn(it, ... , in) is an expression

2. if i 1 , i 2 are terms, then i 1

= i2

is an expression

is an expression then -,¢> is an expression

3. if

</>

4. if

l/J, '1/; are expressions then ( ¢J 1\ '1/;) is an expression

5. if ¢Y is an expression and x E V occurs free in

l/J, then 3x¢> is an expression

6. nothing else is an expression

An interpretation of PCI is a pair I= (D, Q) where Dis a nonempty set and Q is a
mapping defined on P satisfying:

2. if c E C, then Q(c) ED
3. if fn E Fn, then Q(fn) E -p'D"
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4. Q( =) is the diagonal relation on 1)

Let g

e vv

be an assignment of values to variables. Define an extension g* of g to

the set of terms of PCI as follows:

1. if x E V, then g*(x) := g(x)

2. if c E C, then g*(c) := Q(c)

3. if/"' E Fn. and t1, ... , tn are terms, theng*(J"'(tl, ... , tn.)) := Q(f"')(g*(tl), ... ,g*(tn.))

Let 4> be an expression of PCI. Then 4> is satisfied by g in I (written If= f/>[g]) iff one
of the following holds:

1. 4> = R"'(h, ... , tn) and (g*(tl), ... ,g*(tn)) E Q(R"')

2. 4>

= (t1 = t 2) and g*(tl) = g*(t2)

3. 4> =

...,tP and I

4. 4> =

tP A() and (I F 1P[g] and I f= 8[g])

5. 4>

~

1P[g]

= 3x1P, where x occurs free in 1P, and there exists g' E vv that agrees with g

off x such that If=

tP[91

The usual definitions and notational conventions defined for PCS carry over to PCI.

4.2

Translation to PCI

A translation function r from PCS into PCI is defined

as follows. For atomic expressions:
14

2. Sl( X)

f-+ Cj

= X

This definition for atomic expressions is extended to a {A, •, (3x )xev )-homomorphism.

=

Let I

(V, 9) and I'

=

(V, 9') be interpretations of PCS and PCI, respectively,

over the same universe. Then I and I' are similar iff

1. 9(Ri) =

9'(Rf)

2. 9(Sl) ={(d)} iff 9'(ci) = d
3. (dt, ... ,dn,d) E 9(Si+l) iff9'(fr)(dt, ... ,dn) = d

LEMMA

5 Let I and I' be similar interpretations of PCS and PCI, respectively, over

universe 1J. Let g E

proof:
Thus

T

vv

and</> E PCS. Then If= </>[g) iff I'

The proof is a straightforward induction on the structure of ¢>.
is a mapping of PCS into PCI.

Translation from PCI

4.3

Next consider a translation

defined for atomic expressions:

1.

Ci

f= T(</>)[g].

= x

r-+

Sl(x)
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T1

of PCI into PCS,

2. Ci

= t ~ 3x(Sl(x) A r'(t = x)), where t ¢ V

4. ff(x~, ... , Xn) = t ~ 3x(Si+l(x~, ... , Xn, x) A r'(t
5. ff(t~, ... ,tn)

=t

~ 3xk1 (r'(tk 1

= x)), where t ¢ V

= xkJ A··· A 3xkm(r'(tkm = Xkm)A

x)ASf+l(x 1, ... , Xn, x)) ···),where t, tk1 ,

••• ,

3x(r'(t

tkm f/_ V and ( {t1, ... , tn}-{ tk1 ,

=

• ·.,

tkm})

~v

6 . .R'/(lt, ... , tn) ~ 3Xk1 (r'(tk 1 = Xk 1 )A·· ·A3xkm (r'(tkm = Xkm)A R'/(xt, · · ·, Xn)) · · · ),

where tkn· .. , tkm fj. V and ({tt, ... , tn}- {tkn·. ·, tkm}) ~ V

As with

T,

this definition of r' for atomic expressions is extended to a (A, •, (3x )xev}-

homomorphism. Note that r' is partial since r'(x 1

= x2) is not defined.

Let PCit be

the domain of r'.

LEMMA

6 Let I and I' be similar interpretations of PCS and PC!, respectively, over

universe V. Let g E

proof:

vv

and tf; E PCI1 • Then I'

f= tf;[g]

iff If= r'(.,P)[g].

The proof is a straightforward induction on the structure of t/J.

Therefore, PCS and PCI1 are equivalent in expressiveness, and any deficit in expressiveness of PCS is restricted to the difference PCI- PCI1 • More precisely, any deficit
in expressiveness of PCS is restricted to those wffs of PCI- PCI1 containing noneliminable occurrences of atomic expressions of the form x 1

= x2•

Occurrences of atomic

expressions of the form x 1 = x 2 in a wff tf; are eliminable iff there exists a wff tf;' such

16

that for any interpretation I of PCI,

IF .,P' iff I F .,P.

Let PCh be the set of wffs

containing noneliminable occurrences of expressions of the form Xt

= x2.

That PCI2

is not empty is shown next.
Consider the unary predicate

mE PCI and let .,p = 3xtVx2(m(x2) +-+ (x2 = Xt)).

Then in any interpretation I'= (V,Q} of PCI, I'

F .,P only if card(Q(m)) =

1. The

next lemma shows that PCS is indifferent to this property.

LEMMA

7 There is no closed wff <P E PCS such that for every interpretation I

(V, 9} of PCS, I

proof:

F <P only if card(Q(m)) =

=

1.

Let <P E PCS and let n E w such that if

SJ occurs in

<P

then j < n. Let

It = {w, 9t} and I 2 = {w, Y2} be interpretations of PCS, where Yt and 9 2 are defined
as follows. 9t(m)
predicates

= {(n}}

and 9 2(Rf,)

= {(n}, {m}}

for n < m, and for all other

R} of PCS, 9t(R}) = 92 (R}) = 0. For all singular predicates SJ of PCS,

9t(Sj) = 92(Sj) = {{it, ... , iz-t,j} :it, ... , iz-t E w }.
It suffices to show the following. If <Pis any rectified wff of PCS with free variables
Xt, •.. ,

xz, then 3it, ... , iz

E w: It

F </J[it, ... , iz] iff 3jt, ... ,jz E w: I2 F <P[it, ... ,jz].

The proof is by induction on the structure of </J.
For the basis, let <P

= P 1(x 17 ••• , xz)

of PCS. First suppose that It
1 ~ k

< I,

if i~c =f:. m then jk

F

= i~c

the definitions of 9 1 and Q2 that I

where P 1 is an ordinary or singular predicate

P 1[i1, ... , iz]. Define bi1 , ••• , bi, as follows. For
and if i~c
2

=m

then jk

F P 1[j17 ••• ,jz].
17

= m + 1.

It follows from

For the converse, suppose that

I 2 I= P 1[it,

... ,j1]. Define it, ... , iz as follows. For 1 < k :5 l, if ik =f. m then

i~e = j~e

and if jk = m then i~e = n. Again it follows from the definitions of 9t and Q2 that
It

I= P 1[i 17 ••• , iz].

Hence It

I= P 1 [i~, ... , iz] iff I2 I= P 1[it, ... ,jz].

The induction step is straightforward.
It remains to show that the deficit in expressiveness of PCS relative to PCI is exactly

PCI2.

THEOREM

8 Let I' and I be similar interpretations of POI and POS, respectively,

and .,P be a wff of POI. There exists a wff ¢> of POS such that {I'

I= .,P[g] iff I I= tf>[g)}

iff '1/J ¢ P0/2.

proof:

The 'if' direction is an immediate corollary of Lemma 6. For the 'only if'

direction, suppose ¢>is a wff of PCS such that I'
I'

I= T(t/>)[g] iff I I= tf>[g].

of the form Xt

I= .,P[g] iff I I= tf>[g].

By Lemma 5,

By definition, T(t/>) has no occurrences of atomic expressions

= x 2. Therefore, .,P ¢ PCI2.

While the meaning ofthe wff 3xt Vx 2(.m(x 2) +-+ (x 2 = Xt)) of PCI cannot be expressed
by a wff of PCS, the meaning can be expressed by a schema of PCS. Indeed an identity
relation can be defined by the schema I:

THEOREM

9 Let I= (V, Q} be a POS model of schema I. Then Q(_m) is the diagonal

relation on V' ={dE V: It= S[d], where Sis a singular expression}.

18

proof:

iff I

F

Let d~, d2 E 1J such that I

f= S1[d1]

and I

f= S2[d2].

Then I

f=

R6[d~, d2]

3xl(Sl(xl) A 3x2(S2(x2) A m(xt,x2))) (definition of satisfaction) iff I

3x(S1(x) A S2(x)) (schema 1.) iff 3!d E 1J: (If= St[d]) A (I
satisfaction and Lemma 1) iff d1

f= S2[d])

F

(definition of

= d2 •

1J' is the set of named elements of the universe 'D. It follows from the theorem that for

any set of axiom schemas in PCI there exists a semantically equivalent set of axiom
schemas in PCS.
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Conclusion

Sommers' position on identity has not received the attention it

deserves. Part of the reason is perhaps that his argument was presented in the context
of the Calculus of Terms ([6]), running counter to the prevailing bias that only MPL
can be taken seriously. Further, his argument appears to be incomplete, dealing only
with individual constants.
This paper gives a full answer to Sommers' question, 'Do We Need Identity?'. The
argument is couched in MPL, modified only as much as necessary to eliminate the
distinction between concept and object. The answer given here essentially supports
Sommers' position.
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